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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 19-2271  
 
______________ 
 
EDWIN ANTHONY RAMOS-RAMIREZ, 
      Appellant   
v. 
 
BERWICK BOROUGH; KENNETH STRISH; REAGAN RAFFERTY; RANDY 
GAUGER 
      
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 4-17-cv-01442) 
District Judge: Hon. Matthew W. Brann 
______________ 
 
Argued on January 21, 2020 
______________ 
 
Before: AMBRO, MATEY, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
  
(Opinion filed:  August 7, 2020) 
 
 
Curt M. Parkins  (ARGUED) 
Matthew T. Comerford 
Comerford Law 
204 Wyoming Avenue 
Scranton, PA 18503 
 
    Counsel for Appellant 
 
 
David J. MacMain  (ARGUED) 
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Samantha Ryan 
MacMain Connell & Leinhauser 
433 West Market Street 
Suite 200 
West Chester, PA 19382 
 
    Counsel for Appellees 
 
 ______________  
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
  
While responding to a domestic dispute call, Police Officer Reagan 
Rafferty shot Appellant Edwin Anthony Ramos-Ramirez.  Following the incident, 
Ramos-Ramirez pled guilty to simple assault with a deadly weapon. Ramos-
Ramirez then filed the present lawsuit alleging that he was subjected to 
constitutionally excessive force.  The District Court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants, holding that Appellant’s excessive force claim was barred 
by his guilty plea to simple assault under Heck v. Humphrey.1  We conclude that 
the District Court erred in its application of Heck.  Therefore, we will vacate the 
District Court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.  
 
 
 
 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
1 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). 
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I. 
This case arose out of an August 15, 2015 domestic dispute in Berwick 
Borough, at the home of Appellant’s girlfriend, Brittany Cope.  After an argument 
between Appellant and Cope, Appellant locked Cope out of the home.  In 
response, Cope called her ex-boyfriend, Alfredo Melendez, to come over and 
“kick [Appellant] out of [her] house.”2  Appellant asserts that when Melendez 
arrived he tried to enter the house through a window and, although Melendez did 
not succeed in entering the house, he managed to hit Appellant through the 
window with a large stick.  Appellant then grabbed a knife from the kitchen and, 
according to Cope, tried to stab Melendez with the knife through the open 
window.  Over the course of this encounter, both Cope and Appellant called 911.   
  At around 11p.m., Officer Rafferty, Chief Kenneth Strish and Officer 
Randy Gauger responded to two calls requesting assistance at Cope’s address: one 
regarding a suspicious person and the other related to a domestic dispute involving 
a man armed with a knife.  Officer Rafferty was the first to arrive on the scene.  
He testified that upon arrival, he saw Melendez on the porch of the residence 
holding a stick.  After Officer Rafferty exited his car, he saw Appellant come out 
onto the porch of the house, holding a knife.  Rafferty remained on the sidewalk 
separated from Appellant and Melendez by a small retaining wall.  At this point, 
the testimony diverges.   
 
2 Appx126-27. 
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Appellant claims that he walked onto the porch, heard someone yelling to 
drop the knife, and was almost immediately shot.3  He claims that he was shot 
while standing on the porch, and that he was not making any threatening or 
aggressive movements or gestures toward Melendez.  Appellant further testified 
that Melendez backed away across the yard when Appellant emerged from the 
house and was approximately 20 feet away from Appellant at the time Officer 
Rafferty fired his weapon.   
Certain aspects of Appellant’s testimony were corroborated in a deposition 
by Cope.  Her deposition testimony, however, conflicts with the signed statement 
that she provided to police on the night of the incident.  In her deposition, Cope 
states that Appellant was not chasing Melendez but “just came off of the porch” 
when the “cops shot him.”4  However, in the statement provided to the police 
officers on the night of the incident, Cope said “Anthony opened the door and ran 
after [A]lfredo with the knife.  As Anthony was running the police office[r] said 
twice to put the knife down [a]nd he did not.  The police . . . shot once at Anthony 
in his shoulder.”5  When asked about the inconsistency between her statement to 
police and her deposition testimony, Cope said “I assumed that [Ramos-Ramirez] 
 
3Appellant states that the police did not identify themselves upon arrival to the 
scene and that he did not know that police were present.  Cope corroborates this 
testimony saying “nobody knew it was the police when they came until after he 
shot him.” Appx138.  Officer Rafferty also testified that he turned off his lights 
and sirens about a block before arriving.  
4 Appx139. 
5 SAppx62-63. 
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was going towards [Melendez] but I don’t know where he was going because the 
cop shot him as soon as he came off the porch.”6   
In contrast to Appellant and Cope’s testimony, police officers on the scene 
and Melendez all state that Appellant was actively chasing Melendez with a knife 
at the time he was shot.  In his interview with police officers after the incident, 
Melendez stated that he heard the police yell “drop it, drop the knife, drop the 
weapons” and that Appellant was within four feet of Melendez when he was shot.7  
Similarly, Officer Rafferty testified that he observed the Appellant exit the house 
with a knife and Melendez with a wooden stick.  He stated that he ordered both 
men to drop their weapons.  Melendez complied but Appellant did not drop his 
knife.  Officer Rafferty stated that he witnessed Appellant chasing Melendez with 
the knife.  Officer Rafferty then claims that he fired his weapon when Appellant 
was within a few feet of Melendez.  He asserts that he believed Appellant was 
going to stab Melendez.  Additionally, Chief Strish testified that as he was pulling 
up and putting his car in park, he witnessed Appellant chasing Melendez with the 
knife raised above his head. 
On January 10, 2017, Appellant pled guilty to simple assault with a deadly 
weapon.  During the plea colloquy in state court, the court stated “[t]he elements 
of this kind of simple assault is that you attempted to cause bodily injury to 
another person, and in this particular case with a deadly weapon, specifically a 
 
6 Appx139-40. 
7 SAppx20-21. 
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knife.”8  Next, the facts of the case were read: “It is alleged that on or about the 
15th day of August, 2015, in the Borough of Berwick, the Defendant did attempt to 
cause bodily injury to the victim Alfredo Melendez using a deadly weapon, 
namely a knife, by chasing him with said knife.”9  Then, the court asked Appellant 
if those facts are true, to which he replied “Yes, your honor.”10  Based on these 
facts, the court accepted Appellant’s guilty plea.  
At sentencing, the facts of Appellant’s plea were reiterated and Appellant’s 
defense counsel stated, “Mr. Ramos understands that he had a knife and it appears 
like he was going into[sic] Mr. Melendez’s direction.”11  
To commence the present action, Appellant filed a Complaint alleging 
Monell claims against Appellees Berwick Borough and Chief Strish, an excessive 
force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Rafferty, a civil rights 
conspiracy claim against all Appellees, and supplemental state claims for various 
state torts against Officer Rafferty.12  Ultimately, the District Court granted 
Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment, holding that Appellant’s § 1983 
excessive force claim was barred by Heck v. Humphrey.13 
This appeal followed. 
 
8 Appx444. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 SAppx68. 
12 Appx017. 
13 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 
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II.14 
  Appellant argues that the District Court erred in concluding that his 
excessive force claim was barred by Heck v. Humphrey.15  In Heck, the Supreme 
Court held that that a plaintiff may not recover damages under § 1983 if doing so 
would imply the invalidity of a prior conviction, unless the plaintiff can 
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.16   For 
Heck to apply “it must be the case that a successful § 1983 suit and the underlying 
conviction be logically contradictory.”17  Other courts of appeals have generally 
held that the mere fact of a conviction for assault or similar conduct does not 
automatically preclude recovery on an excessive force claim brought 
under § 1983, arising out of the same incident.18   
Similarly, in Nelson v. Jashurek, this Court determined that convictions for 
resisting arrest do not necessarily invalidate § 1983 excessive force claims stating, 
“it is possible for a finding that [the defendant] was resisting arrest to coexist with 
 
14 The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331, 1343.  This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The 
Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.  
Pennsylvania Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995).  
15 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). 
16 Id. at 487. 
17 Dyer v. Lee, 488 F.3d 876, 884 (11th Cir. 2007). 
18 See, e.g., Dyer, 488 F.3d at 883; McCann v. Neilsen, 466 F.3d 619, 620 (7th Cir. 
2006); Thore v. Howe, 466 F.3d 173, 180 (1st Cir. 2006); Ballard v. Burton, 444 
F.3d 391, 400-01 (5th Cir. 2006); Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 
1996) (per curiam). 
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a finding that the police used excessive force to subdue him.19  In keeping with 
Nelson, we conclude that simple assault with a deadly weapon under Pennsylvania 
law is not necessarily inconsistent with an excessive force claim. It is possible that 
an individual could attempt to cause bodily injury to a third party and that a police 
officer could use excessive force in their attempt to intervene.20  
However, even where a particular type of conviction is not necessarily 
inconsistent with a § 1983 suit, courts look to the underlying facts pled to assess 
whether a claim is barred by Heck.21  The First Circuit discussed this factual 
approach in O’Brien v. Town of Bellingham, stating “[a] plaintiff’s excessive force 
claim and his conviction ‘may be so interrelated factually as to bar the § 1983 
claim.’”22  In such circumstances, “to determine Heck’s applicability, a court must  
. . . [ask] whether the plaintiff could prevail only by ‘negat[ing] an element of the 
offense of which he [was] convicted.’”23   
 
19 109 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted) (holding that a 
reasonable juror could find that the arrestee resisted arrest, but was still subjected 
to excessive force). 
20 Under Pennsylvania law, simple assault occurs where an individual “attempts to 
cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.”  
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1).  In contrast, excessive force occurs where an officer 
uses unreasonable or excessive force to bring an arrestee into custody. Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
21 McCann, 466 F.3d at 621-22. 
22 943 F.3d 514, 529 (1st Cir. 2019) (citing Thore v. Howe, 466 F.3d 173, 180 (1st 
Cir. 2006)). 
23 Id. (last two alterations in original) (quoting Thore, 466 F.3d at 180).  
9 
 
Appellant pled guilty to simple assault asserting that he attempted to cause 
bodily injury to Melendez “by chasing him with [a] knife.”24  Now, in pursuit of a 
civil judgment against Officer Rafferty, Appellant makes two arguments.  First, 
Appellant argues that Officer Rafferty used excessive force because Appellant was 
not chasing Melendez.  Second, Appellant argues that even if he was chasing 
Melendez, Officer Rafferty’s force was excessive because Appellant was too far 
away from Melendez to stab him and, thus, was not an immediate threat. Although 
Appellant’s first argument would negate an element of his simple assault 
conviction and is barred by Heck, Appellant’s second argument does not imply the 
invalidity of his conviction. Therefore, to the extent that Appellant argues that he 
was simply too far away from Melendez to pose an immediate threat, Appellant’s 
excessive force claim is not barred by Heck. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment to 
the extent that it granted Appellees summary judgment under Heck v. Humphrey 
and will remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.  
 
24 Appx444. 
